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SIMPSON V. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO: TITLE IX
CRASHES THE PARTY IN COLLEGE
ATHLETIC RECRUITING
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2001, visiting high school recruits and football
players at the University of Colorado sexually assaulted three female
students, propelling the school into national headlines.1 The fact that
the alleged assaults occurred as a result of a university-sanctioned pro-
gram amplified the reprehensible nature of the incidents. 2 Later in-
vestigation revealed that the Colorado football program had a policy
of appointing player-hosts to show recruits "a good time" while they
were on campus, which usually meant providing alcohol and opportu-
nities for sex.3 Not only did the University essentially sanction this
behavior, but it was also aware of similar abuses and previous sexual
assaults within the program.4 The assaults placed the University at
the heart of a scandal, spawned an extensive investigation of athletic
department policies, triggered the ouster of numerous University offi-
cials, and exposed the University to substantial liability when two of
the sexually assaulted students filed suit under Title IX.5
Initially, it appeared that University officials could breathe a sigh of
relief. The Colorado district court granted summary judgment to the
University,6 and the ongoing public relations nightmare seemed to be
coming to a close.7 In September 2007, however, in Simpson v. Uni-
versity of Colorado Boulder, the Tenth Circuit overturned the lower
1. Erik Brady, Colorado Scandal Fallout: Title IX Lawsuit that Led to Probes Could Have
Wide Implications, USA TODAY, May 26, 2004, at 1C.
2. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170. 1174 (10th Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 1175, 1179 n.3.
4. Id. at 1180-84.
5. Kevin Vaughan, No Settlement on CU's Radar, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Sept. 8, 2007, at 4. Title
IX is the federal statute prohibiting discrimination based on sex in educational programs and
activities that receive federal funding. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681-1688 (2000).
6. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1246 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub nom.
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
7. Christine Reid, CU Officials Don't Expect Backlash After Revival of Women's Lawsuit,
DAILY CAMERA, Sept. 9, 2007, at Al (noting University officials' relief after the district court's
favorable ruling).
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court's decision and held that the plaintiffs could attempt to prove at
trial that the University was liable under Title IX.8
The question of whether the University could face liability under
Title IX for its official recruitment policies has drawn the attention of
university athletic administrations nationwide. 9 While the lower court
looked to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which sets a high threshold
for notice and deliberate indifference requirements under Title IX,1°
the Tenth Circuit focused instead on the University's "official policy"
of showing recruits a good time."1
Though university athletic program directors and plaintiff advocates
disagree over the meaning of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, both sides
agree that the opinion frames Title IX liability in a novel way. 12 Crit-
ics argue that the ruling expands Title IX's reach beyond what Con-
gress intended, 13 while supporters claim that the decision "is not a
departure from-but an effectuation of-the purposes of Title IX."'14
Since its initial ruling, the Tenth Circuit denied requests to rehear the
matter en banc, and the University reluctantly decided to settle the
lawsuit for nearly three million dollars. 15
The Simpson decision has serious implications for all university ath-
letic programs that receive federal funding.16 But does it unnecessa-
rily extend Title IX liability simply to overcome the injustice that
would otherwise occur if the statute's interpretation remained re-
stricted to its previous confines?1 7 This Note focuses on how the court
interpreted Title IX to provide a remedy for instances of sexual mis-
conduct in academic settings. Specifically, this Note argues that Simp-
son is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the legislative
intent of Title IX. Part II establishes the framework from which Title
IX emerged and describes how courts have interpreted the legislation
8. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1185.
9. Brady, supra note 1.
10. See infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 103-117 and accompanying text.
12. See Brittany Anas, CU Appeals Title IX Ruling, DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 10, 2007, at 3A.
13. Vaughan, supra note 5 ("We are looking at a new legal standard, never previously applied
.... We are in uncharted legal waters that I think will cause grave problems for every university
in the United States.").
14. Anas, supra note 12.
15. Allison Sherry, CU Settles Case Stemming from Recruit Scandal, DENVER POST, Dec. 6,
2007, at A-01. University president Hank Brown stated that the University reached its decision
in light of the prospect of the case dragging on for years, resulting in soaring legal costs. Id.
16. See Vaughan, supra note 5.
17. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., No. 02-CV-2390-REB-CBS, 2007 WL 1217173, at *10 (D.
Colo. Apr. 24, 2007) ("[A] cry for justice 'does not mean that Title IX should be expanded to
provide justice simply because the cry for justice has not been answered otherwise."').
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over the past three decades.18 Part III summarizes the district court's
and Tenth Circuit's opinions in Simpson.' 9 Part IV examines both
opinions from perspectives of law and policy, in an attempt to deter-
mine which approach better comports with the spirit of Title IX.20 Fi-
nally, Part V predicts Simpson's impact on educational institutions
and how the Supreme Court might resolve the case if it were to ex-
amine it today.2'
II. BACKGROUND
Judicial interpretation of Title IX has evolved significantly since
Congress passed the original legislation over thirty-five years ago.
Section A provides an overview of the goal of Title IX and describes
how courts have interpreted the statute to provide a remedy for sexual
harassment.22 Section B examines the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Title IX in recent years. 23
A. Title IX: Overview
Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 to promote equal opportunities
for female students in schools receiving federal funding.2 4 The statute
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. '2 5 Though Title IX has been
on the books for over thirty-five years, courts' interpretation of the
statute has changed substantially, particularly in the area of sexual
harassment.2 6
In the past, plaintiffs most commonly invoked Title IX to ensure
equal representation and funding for female students in interscholas-
tic athletics.27 Title IX protections, however, extend beyond the ath-
18. See infra notes 22-74 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 118-197 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 198-236 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 38-74 and accompanying text.
24. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
25. Id.
26. See Diane Heckman, Is Notice Required in a Title IX Athletics Action Not Involving Sexual
Harassment?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 175. 179 (2003); Christopher M. Parent, Personal Fouls:
How Sexual Assault by Football Players is Exposing Universities to Title IX Liability, 13 FORD-
HAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 617, 626 (2003).
27. See MARK JONES, A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK FOR UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT UNDER TITLE IX 4 (2006), available at http://educationlawconsortium.org/forum/2006/pa-
pers/Jones2006_l.pdf.
2008]
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letic arena. Today, the statute impacts nearly every aspect of equal
access to educational opportunities, including protection against sex-
ual harassment. 28 The Supreme Court has recognized that Title IX
prohibits sexual harassment in private and public educational institu-
tions receiving federal funding.29 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,
shortly after the legislation's enactment, the Court recognized the pos-
sibility of private lawsuits under the statute.30 Later, in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Court expanded Title IX's possi-
ble remedies by making compensatory and punitive damages
available.31
The Office of Civil Rights, the Department of Education's Title IX
compliance agency, defines sexual harassment as unwelcome sexual
conduct, which includes "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a
sexual nature. ' 32 This broad definition includes severe incidents of
harassment, such as sexual assault, as well as offenses such as unwel-
come flirtation and comments. 33
Following Title IX's inception, courts divided sexual harassment
under the statute into two distinct categories: quid pro quo and hos-
tile environment. 34 Quid pro quo harassment involves a teacher or
employee who conditions a benefit upon a student's accession to un-
28. Id.
29. See Diane Heckman, Deconstructing Title IX Sexual Harassment Matters Involving Stu-
dents and Student-Athletes in the Post-Davis Era, 206 EDUC. L. REP. 469, 470 (2006) (citing
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)).
30. 441 U.S. 677, 702-03 (1979) (noting the language of the original bill and its amendments
did not mention the prohibition of such suits). Prior to this decision, an individual could not
legally enforce Title IX claims and would instead have to file an in-house or OCR (Office of
Civil Rights) complaint. LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX 21-26
(2005).
31. CARPENTER & ACOSTA, supra note 30, at 124; see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992) (finding that Title IX permits a private action for damages in cases in
which the plaintiff alleges intentional discrimination). Because courts allow individuals to collect
monetary damages, plaintiffs have a newfound incentive to bring lawsuits, and schools must be
more proactive in complying with Title IX.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUI-
DANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES 2 (2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf [herein-
after SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE].
33. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) ("'Discrimination' is a
term that covers a wide range of intentional unequal treatment; by using such a broad term,
Congress gave [Title IX] a broad reach.").
34. Deanna DeFrancesco, Jennings v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Title IX,
Intercollegiate Athletics, and Sexual Harassment, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1271, 1276-79 (2007) (explain-
ing how Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-3 (2000), was used to lay a foundation for sexual
harassment claims, which courts later translated into promotion of equal protection under Title
IX).
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welcome sexual conduct.35 Hostile environment harassment involves
third-party harassment so serious that it "den[ies] or limit[s] a stu-
dent's ability to participate in or benefit from the school's program
based on sex."'36 Schools will typically face hostile environment liabil-
ity by ignoring ongoing peer-on-peer harassment, thereby creating an
environment not conducive to academic success as a result of constant
fear and subjugation. 37
B. Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting Sexual
Harassment under Title IX
After the Supreme Court created the possibility of private causes of
action for violations of Title IX,38 the standard for holding a school or
educational program liable under the statute remained unclear.39 Be-
tween 1998 and 1999, the Court issued two opinions attempting to fur-
ther clarify the contours of Title IX liability.
1. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District: Teacher-on-
Student Harassment
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Supreme
Court considered a claim for monetary damages by a victim of
teacher-student sexual harassment.40 Gebser involved a male high
school teacher who sexually harassed a female student over a two-
year period.41 The harassment included inappropriate comments and
touching, which eventually led to a sexual relationship between the
two parties. 42 Though the victim never reported the incidents to
school officials, the parents of other students complained to the princi-
pal about inappropriate comments the teacher made during class.43
The principal responded by warning the teacher about his inappropri-
ate classroom comments. 44 After police discovered the teacher and
victim engaging in sexual intercourse, the victim and her mother filed
35. SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 12-14.
38. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 702-03 (1979).
39. See Parent, supra note 26, at 628.
40. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
41. Id. at 277-78.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 278.
44. Id.
2008]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
suit against the school district under Title IX, seeking compensatory
and punitive damages. 45
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor explained that because a
private right of action under Title IX was a judicial creation, the Court
possessed "a measure of latitude [in] shap[ing] a sensible remedial
scheme that best comports with the statute. '46 In doing so, the Court
cautioned against frustrating the purposes of Title IX by allowing lia-
bility based on respondeat superior or constructive notice.47 Instead
of adopting an overly broad approach, the Court held:
[I]n cases like this one that do not involve official policy of the re-
cipient entity ... a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX un-
less an official who at a minimum has authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the re-
cipient's programs and fails adequately to respond. 48
Gebser also addressed what constitutes an improper response to
claims of sexual harassment once a school has actual notice. The
school would be liable if it responded to the harassment with deliber-
ate indifference, which means that the school officially decided to ig-
nore the violation. 49 Because the school in Gebser had actual notice
of only the inappropriate comments and not the sexual encounters,
the Court found that the victim's claims did not satisfy the notice and
deliberate indifference requirements for a private suit under Title
IX.50
45. Id. at 278-79. The original complaint included a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state
negligence law claim, and other claims under state law, but the plaintiffs only appealed the Title
IX claim. Id. at 279.
46. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
47. Id. at 285. In particular, the Court feared creating a situation in which schools would be
liable not only for their own actions but also for the independent actions of their employees, thus
creating the possibility of unavoidable, crushing liability. Id. at 290 ("[An award of damages in
a particular case might well exceed a recipient's level of federal funding."): see also Jennie E.
Spies, Comment, Winning at All Costs: An Analysis of a University's Potential Liability for Sex-
ual Assaults Committed by Its Student Athletes, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 429, 443 (2006).
48. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added). Here, the Court looked to the language of Title
IX, in particular 20 U.S.C. § 1682, which states that an agency cannot take action until it "has
advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement." Id. at
288 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1682).
49. Id. at 290-91 (comparing this standard to that found in § 1983 claims, which bases the
violation on a municipality's failure to prevent a deprivation of federal rights).
50. Id. at 291-92.
[Vol. 58:153
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2. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of
Education: Peer-on-Peer Harassment
The Supreme Court further refined its Title IX analysis in Davis ex
rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education.51 In ad-
dressing a claim of student-on-student harassment, the Court held that
a plaintiff may bring a private Title IX damages action only if the edu-
cational institution has actual knowledge of the discrimination, is de-
liberately indifferent to it, and the discrimination is so severe and
offensive that it deprives the victim of access to educational opportu-
nities and benefits. 52
In Davis, the parents of a female elementary school student sued
the school district under Title IX, alleging a "prolonged pattern of sex-
ual harassment" by one of her classmates. 53 The harassment allegedly
included inappropriate touching and comments, which the victim and
her parents reported to the school's teachers and principal.5 4 Despite
those reports, the harassment continued, and as a result, the victim's
grades suffered and eventually she became suicidal. 55 The victim's
parents claimed that the school's response was inadequate because it
failed to stop the harassment.5 6
Writing the majority opinion for a divided Court, Justice O'Connor
carefully clarified that an educational institution may face liability
only for its own misconduct. 57 Still, the Court observed that the
school district could face liability for student-on-student harassment,
which was markedly different from the traditional quid pro quo ap-
proach seen in previous cases.58 The opinion discussed a school's po-
tential liability for ignoring a hostile environment that is exacerbated
by the school's official decision to "remain idle in the face of known
student-on-student harassment." 59
In reaffirming the actual notice and deliberate indifference stan-
dards articulated in Gebser,60 Justice O'Connor's opinion included
two additional considerations. First, a school district is deemed delib-
51. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
52. Id. at 650.
53. Id. at 632-33.
54. Id. at 633-34.
55. Id. at 634.
56. Id. at 635.
57. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640-41.
58. Id. at 652-53. Previously, courts interpreting Title IX found that Title IX only addressed
instances of teacher-student harassment and did not apply if a school employee was not directly
involved. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
59. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641, 643.
60. Gebser. 524 U.S. at 274.
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erately indifferent only when its response to student-on-student har-
assment "is clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances."'6 1 Additionally, private damage actions under Title IX
are limited to situations in which the harassment is "so severe, perva-
sive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims
of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school. "62
Though the majority allowed private damage suits alleging peer-on-
peer sexual harassment under Title IX, the Court made clear that lia-
bility is limited to situations where the school "exercises substantial
control over both the harasser and the context in which the known
harassment occurs. '63 Because the school district controlled both the
circumstances and the harasser in Davis, the Court found that the
school district could be liable under a deliberate indifference theory.64
Even though the majority set a high threshold for liability in these
situations, Justice Kennedy's lengthy dissent predicted a flood of lia-
bility as a result of the majority's approach. 65 In particular, he focused
on the lack of clarity regarding a school's liability under the statute.66
Justice Kennedy further reasoned that Congress never anticipated Ti-
tle IX liability in situations of peer-on-peer sexual harassment.67 Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, by granting federal enforcement power
over these situations, schools will divert scarce resources from educat-
ing children and instead invest in measures to align school procedures
with the federal guidelines imposed by the Department of
Education.68
3. The Current State of the Law
A private plaintiff seeking damages under Title IX must prove four
factors in order to prevail: (1) the school or educational institution
61. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Justice O'Connor also noted that "courts should refrain from
second-guessing the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators." Id. (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)).
62. Id. at 650. According to the Court, the decision of whether the student's sexual harass-
ment is actionable under Title IX "depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships." Id. at 651 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75, 92 (1998)).
63. Id. at 645.
64. Id. at 654.
65. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The fence the Court has built is made of little sticks,
and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set in motion.").
66. Id. at 656-57.
67. Davis, 526 U.S. at 656-57.
68. Id. at 657-58.
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must receive federal funding;69 (2) the institution must have actual-
not constructive-notice of the discrimination; 70 (3) the institution
must be deliberately indifferent to the discrimination; 71 and (4) the
discrimination must be so severe that it denies the plaintiff an educa-
tional benefit.72 Though the Gebser and Davis decisions have at-
tempted to construct a framework for dealing with private damage
suits under Title IX, subsequent courts have interpreted these opin-
ions inconsistently. 73 In particular, courts have struggled to define
what constitutes proper notice, how hostile an environment must be-
come, and how deliberate the defendant's indifference must be before
a court may find an educational institution liable under the statute. 74
III. SUBJECT OPINION: SIMPSON V. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
BOULDER
The Simpson case began in the U.S. District Court of Colorado.
Section A discusses the district court's opinion, which granted the
University's motion for summary judgment. 75 Section B then consid-
ers the plaintiffs' appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
reversed the district court. 76
A. The District Court's Decision
Plaintiffs Lisa Simpson and Anne Gilmore brought suit under Title
IX against the University of Colorado (CU), alleging that they were
sexually assaulted by CU football players and recruits during a party
at Ms. Simpson's apartment on December 7, 2001.77 A CU football
player and an athletic department tutor organized the party, which
was allegedly part of an informal recruiting event organized to pro-
vide visiting high school recruits an opportunity to drink and have sex
with female CU students.78 A number of players and recruits visited
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
70. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1997).
71. Id.
72. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
73. Heckman, supra note 29, at 474.
74. Id.
75. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1246 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub nom.
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007); see infra notes 77-102 and
accompanying text.
76. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007); see infra notes
103-117 and accompanying text.
77. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1231-32.
78. Id. CU's recruiting process involved bringing up to sixty-two high school students on cam-
pus during football season. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1180. Each of these recruits was paired with a
team "ambassador," who was usually female, to escort the recruit around campus during his
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Ms. Simpson's apartment that evening, and Ms. Simpson eventually
went to bed intoxicated. 79 Later that night, when she awoke in her
bedroom, she found two recruits sexually assaulting her while other
CU football players surrounded the bed.s0 At the same time, players
and recruits were assaulting Ms. Gilmore just a few feet away.81 Both
women claimed they were too intoxicated or terrified to resist. 82
The plaintiffs claimed that their alleged assaults were part of a pat-
tern of which the University had actual knowledge and to which it
remained deliberately indifferent.83 The district court, however,
found that the plaintiffs did not establish a genuine issue of material
fact about whether there was either actual notice or deliberate indif-
ference.8 4 The court therefore granted the University's motion for
summary judgment.85
1. The Notice Requirement
The plaintiffs alleged that University officials, including Coach
Gary Barnett, the head coach of the football program, knew that simi-
lar events had occurred in the past. 86 Plaintiffs offered evidence of a
string of similar reported incidents and argued that these incidents put
University officials on notice of the risk that CU football players and
recruits presented to female students.8 7 First, the plaintiffs identified
a 1997 off-campus party in which a CU football recruit sexually as-
saulted a female, who was not a CU student.88 The Boulder County
District Attorney's Office investigated the incident and advised Uni-
versity officials to implement a zero-tolerance policy regarding alcohol
visit. Id. Recruits were also given a "player-host" during their visit, and coaching staff often
chose these hosts "because they knew how to 'party' and how 'to show recruits a good time."'
Id.
79. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1235.
84. Id. at 1234-35.
85. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1234-35. In arriving at its decision, the court did not dispute
findings that the sexual assaults were "severe and objectively offensive sexual harassment" or
that CU's football coach, Gary Barnett, had the requisite control over the football program. Id.
Additionally, the court found that Athletic Director Richard Tharp and the University Chancel-
lor Richard Byyny also possessed the requisite control over the program. Id. at 1235.
86. Id. at 1235.
87. Id. at 1237-40.
88. Id. at 1237. The court found that this incident did not provide per se notice because the
victim was not a CU student and the assault occurred off campus; however, the court recognized
that the incident could have provided some notice that CU students faced the same risk. Id. at
1238.
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and sex in the recruiting program.8 9 When Coach Barnett came to
CU two years later, the University notified him of the accusations.90
The plaintiffs also pointed to three separate incidents involving
charges of non-sexual assault brought against two members of the
coaching staff and a former player. 91
In another incident, a former recruit, in vague terms, informed
Coach Barnett of the improprieties he witnessed during his recruiting
visit to CU.92 The plaintiffs also alleged that a female football player,
Katherine Hnida, claimed to have been a victim of sexual harassment
while playing on Coach Barnett's team.93 Additionally, in 2001, the
plaintiffs claimed that a CU football player sexually assaulted a fe-
male student trainer just months before the players sexually assaulted
the plaintiffs.94 Finally, the plaintiffs pointed out that two CU players
at the party that evening had been accused of previous sexual assaults,
though there was no record that any CU officials were aware of these
accusations. 95
Throughout its opinion, the district court discounted generalized
risks and closely focused on the particularized risks that football play-
ers and recruits would sexually assault female students as part of the
recruiting program, and that alcohol use would aid or exacerbate
those assaults.96 The court found that only the 1997 assault, the Kath-
erine Hnida harassment, and the 2001 assault provided notice to CU
officials. 97 According to the district court, however, these incidents
did not "constitute a constellation of relevant events that provide[d]
sufficient notice of the broad risk of sexual harassment and assault." 98
89. Id. at 1238.
90. Id.
91. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1238-39. The court concluded that these incidents had little
relevance to the concentrated risk of CU football players and recruits sexually assaulting female
students. Id.
92. Id. at 1239. The judge also found this information irrelevant, because the player did not
inform Coach Barnett of the risk to female students. Id.
93. Id. at 1239-40. These allegations were dismissed as "only obliquely relevant to" the risk at
hand because they involved player-on-player harassment. Id. at 1240.
94. Id. at 1240. Allegedly, Coach Barnett persuaded the trainer not to press charges. Id.
Nonetheless, the district court avoided making a "stereotypical generalization" regarding all
football players on the CU team and found that this incident merely provided notice regarding
the one player involved. Id.
95. Id. Because of the lack of knowledge, the judge also found this information irrelevant. Id.
96. Id. at 1237-41.
97. Simpson, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1240-41.
98. Id. at 1241.
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2. Deliberate Indifference
Assuming that the University had actual notice of the specific risk
involving football players and recruits, the district court went on to
find that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the University acted
with deliberate indifference. 99 The court recognized that even though
the University's efforts, in hindsight, could have been more effective
at combating possible harassment, 00 Title IX does not require the
University to implement the most effective policies, so long as its ex-
isting policies are "not clearly unreasonable." 10 Therefore, the court
found that the University's response to the previous incidents did not
amount to deliberate indifference, and it granted the University's mo-
tion for summary judgment.10 2
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
In September 2007, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
ruling and found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence
to survive the University's motion for summary judgment. 10 3 Instead
of focusing on notice and deliberate indifference, the Tenth Circuit's
decision looked at the program's "official policy of showing high-
school football recruits a 'good time' on their visits to the CU
campus."104
The Tenth Circuit thoroughly examined the analytical framework
laid out in Gebser and Davis, but found that it was an imperfect
framework for analyzing the plaintiffs' claims. 10 5 In particular, the
court noted that those decisions did not address situations in which
the educational institution approved of or encouraged the harass-
ment.10 6 According to the court, ,the actual notice standards estab-
lished in prior decisions did not apply in Simpson because the
99. Id. at 1242.
100. Id. at 1244. As remedial measures, the University refused to admit the recruits involved
in the 1997 assault, suspended the player involved, developed new recruiting guidelines, and
implemented sexual harassment training. Id. at 1242-43.
101. Id. at 1244 (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 643-49 (1999)).
102. Id. at 1246.
103. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007).
104. Id. at 1173. A question remains about the adequacy of the University's response after it
became aware of the assaults. The plaintiffs claimed that University officials did not take imme-
diate corrective action against those involved, that individuals associated with the University
obstructed the investigation, and these individuals continued to resist to recruiting reforms. See
id. at 1174. The post-assault incidents, however, are not relevant in determining if the University
had actual knowledge of the risk involved with its recruiting program.
105. Id. at 1174-78.
106. Id. at 1177.
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previous decisions did not involve official policies of educational insti-
tutions. 10 7 In determining the meaning of the phrase "involve official
policy," the court considered Gebser's reliance on § 1983 claims
against municipalities.108  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit focused on
City of Canton v. Harris, in which the Supreme Court found a munici-
pality liable under § 1983 for failing to properly train its police
officers. 109
The Tenth Circuit's opinion incorporated Gebser's analogy between
Title IX claims and § 1983 claims to articulate a hybrid standard of
liability for Title IX claims involving a school's official policy. 10 The
appellate court concluded that an educational institution intentionally
acts in clear violation of the statute "when the violation is caused by
official policy, which may be a policy of deliberate indifference to pro-
viding adequate training or guidance that is obviously necessary for
implementation of a specific program or policy of the recipient."'1 1
The court further explained that training could be obviously necessary
regardless of knowledge of previous incidents, especially when the na-
ture of the program itself provides notice of additional necessary mea-
sures. 112 In the court's view, a jury could find that the University had
more than sufficient notice of the need for revised training and gui-
dance within its football recruiting program. 1 3 The court also consid-
ered general articles and reports filed in amicus briefs, which
highlighted the increased risk of sexual misconduct with male student
athletes,11 4 as well as the specific incidents involving harassment and
assault at CU detailed in the lower court's decision.' 1 5
107. Id. (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)).
108. Id. at 1176 ("Comparable considerations led to our adoption of the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard for claims under § 1983 alleging that a municipality's actions in failing to prevent a
deprivation of federal rights was the cause of the violation." (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91)).
109. 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The Court in Harris found that a municipality's failure to ade-
quately train its officers amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom
the police had contact. Id. at 390 ("[T]he need for more or different training [may be] so obvi-
ous, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy-
makers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.").
110. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1178.
113. Id. at 1184.
114. Id. at 1181.
115. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1237-40 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub noma.
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). In particular, the Tenth
Circuit focused on the University's failure to institute meaningful changes to its recruiting pro-
gram after the 1997 incident despite pressure from three Boulder County district attorneys.
Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181-83. The court also directed its attention to Coach Barnett's failure to
properly prescribe the limits of recruiting in his player handbook, his retaliation against Kathe-
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After adopting this new standard, the court concluded that although
Coach Barnett had general and specific knowledge of the risk of sex-
ual harassment within CU's recruiting program, he maintained an un-
supervised program with a policy of showing visiting recruits a good
time.116 Thus, the court held that a jury could find "the need for more
or different training [of player-hosts] so obvious, and the inadequacy
so likely to result in [Title IX violations], that [Coach Barnett could]
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need."117
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Simpson v. University of Colorado
Boulder effectively addressed the gross improprieties that occurred
within the University of Colorado football recruiting program. 118 At
the same time, the court's decision reinterpreted Title IX liability for
sexual harassment by allowing for damages when the substantive vio-
lation is the proximate result of an educational institution's official
policy.1 19 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit claims to have abandoned the
Gebser and Davis precedent regarding actual notice standards in favor
of the liability standard of § 1983 claims involving a funding recipi-
ent's official policy.12 0
The Tenth Circuit's approach raises many questions and may estab-
lish a new avenue of liability under Title IX. Section A addresses how
Simpson differs from the Supreme Court's Title IX opinions. 121 Sec-
tion B examines the Tenth Circuit's reliance on § 1983 precedent and
determines that this reliance was proper. 122 Section C considers what
constitutes an official policy of a school receiving federal funding. 123
Section D reexamines the Tenth Circuit's application of this new stan-
dard of liability to the facts of the Simpson case.124 Section E ques-
rine Hnida after she complained of harassment, and his insufficient response to the 2001 sexual
assault allegations of the female trainer. Id. at 1182-83.
116. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184.
117. Id. at 1184-85 (modifications in original) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
390 (1989)).
118. Anas, supra note 12.
119. See Vaughan, supra note 5 ("Universities are being asked to monitor conduct of students
and non-students at levels they've never been asked to before." (quoting CU's attorney, Larry
Pozner)).
120. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1177 (finding the Gebser and Davis framework imperfect);
supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 127-134 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 135-146 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 147-164 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
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tions the Supreme Court's and the Tenth Circuit's notion that actual
notice standards do not apply to situations involving official policy.' 25
Finally, Section F argues that the Tenth Circuit's opinion is not incon-
sistent with the language or purpose of Title IX or with Supreme
Court precedent.' 26
A. How Does Simpson Differ from Other Title IX Cases?
As the district court emphasized, it could not find the University of
Colorado liable under the actual notice and deliberate indifference
standards established in Gebser and Davis because the plaintiffs could
not prove that the University had actual notice of the harassment.1 27
The lower court's decision illustrates how the facts of the Simpson
case differ uniquely from those in typical Title IX sexual harassment
cases. Title IX cases typically involve an identified harasser and an
identified victim who remain constant throughout the period of har-
assment. 128 However, the facts in Simpson show that the parties in-
volved had no contact other than the assaults that occurred on
December 7, 2001.129 Therefore, the University could not possibly
have had notice of this particular harassment prior to its occurrence.
The plaintiffs attempted to present studies showing that male athletes
are more likely to commit sexual assaults,1 30 but this propensity could
not reasonably be imputed to all Colorado football players. 131 None-
theless, the University's continued failure to supervise a program
known to create an environment where sexual exploitation and assault
were likely to occur seems contrary to Title IX's purposes. 132
The Tenth Circuit's opinion, by focusing on the recruiting program
itself, overcomes the high notice standard required by Supreme Court
precedent. The Court's statement in Gebser that the actual notice re-
quirement applies only to "cases... that do not involve official policy
125. See infra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 187-197 and accompanying text.
127. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1242 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub nom.
Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
128. See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S 629 (1999);
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
129. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007).
130. In its amicus brief, the Women Sports Foundation cited numerous articles noting that
male student athletes were "more prone to commit sexual assault than other male students." Id.
at 1181.
131. Brady, supra note 1.
132. Congress enacted Title IX to prevent federal resources from being tsed "to support dis-
criminatory practices." Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
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of the recipient entity" was especially useful.133 Focusing on this lan-
guage from Gebser, the Tenth Circuit opened up a new realm of liabil-
ity that had yet to be clearly defined. 134
B. Is the Comparison of Title IX to § 1983
Municipal Liability Proper?
The Supreme Court first addressed the idea that a deficient policy
may subject a recipient of federal funding to statutory liability in Mo-
nell v. Department of Social Services.'35 In that case, the Court found
that a funding recipient may actually "cause" a violation of constitu-
tional rights through its policy or custom. 136 When later articulating
the Title IX standard for deliberate indifference, the Supreme Court
borrowed from its § 1983 precedent of municipal liability claims. 137 In
Simpson, the Tenth Circuit also compared § 1983 claims of municipal
liability with Title IX sexual harassment claims, 138 but the Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion took its analysis further than both Davis and Gebser.
This comparison is appropriate considering the goals of both pieces of
legislation.
Initially, Title IX and § 1983139 were distinct in that Title IX created
substantive rights-but no private right of action-for students at-
tending educational institutions receiving federal funding, while
§ 1983 provided a means to redress a state actor's deprivation of fed-
133. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
134. See William A. Kaplin, A Typology and Critique of Title IX Sexual Harassment Law After
Gebser and Davis, 26 J.C. & U.L. 615, 632 (2000) ("If a complaint were to allege harassment
based on the institution's official policy.., apparently some liability standard other than Gebser-
Davis would apply."); Brian A. Snow, The Problem of Identifying Title IX Liability, 154 EDUc.
L. REP. 1, 16-17 (2001) (finding the Court's reference to official policy in Gebser "curious" and
recognizing that the Court did not determine whether or how a school might be held liable for
claims involving official policy).
135. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (involving a § 1983 claim).
136. Id. at 694.
137. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290-91. The Court found "comparable considerations" between
Title IX and § 1983 claims, both of which involve a recipient of federal funding that refuses to
remedy violations of federal rights. Id.
138. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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erally protected rights. 140  However, the Court eventually implied a
private right of action under Title IX, making the comparison to
§ 1983 more tenable. 141 Just as Congress intended to provide reme-
dies for violations of federal rights falling under the Equal Protection
Clause in § 1983, courts have interpreted Title IX as a remedial
scheme to establish gender equality in educational institutions. 142 In
fact, many courts are divided on whether Title IX and § 1983 claims
preempt each other because of their similarity.143 In light of this simi-
larity, Gebser's "comparable considerations" to § 1983 claims and the
Tenth Circuit's extension of these comparisons are judicially sound.
In particular, the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit compared
Title IX to § 1983 claims involving municipal liability. A municipality
and an educational institution-both state actors because they receive
federal funding 144-may be liable when their official decisions, poli-
cies, or customs result in discrimination. 145 Like § 1983, Title IX lia-
bility is not based on the theory of respondeat superior, and a court
will hold an educational institution liable only for its own actions or
official policy. 146
C. What Constitutes an Official Policy or Custom?
The language of Title IX is unhelpful in defining what constitutes an
official policy. 147 Clearly, disparate allocation of funding and discrimi-
natory eligibility guidelines are policies covered under Title IX, be-
140. See generally Debora A. Hoehne, Assessing the Compatibility of Title IX and § 1983: A
Post-Abrams Framework for Preemption, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3193-203 (2006).
141. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
142. Melanie Hochberg, Note, Protecting Students Against Peer Sexual Harassment: Con-
gress's Constitutional Powers to Pass Title IX, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 275 (1999) ("Even if Title
IX reaches beyond the protection granted by the Equal Protection Clause, it is consistent with
the Court's constitutional commitments, namely establishing gender equality, and within Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment power.").
143. See generally Hoehne, supra note 140.
144. Liability under Title IX is based on a "contract" between the government and the school
receiving federal funds; by accepting funding, the school promises not to discriminate. See
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286-87.
145. An educational institution only faces liability under Title IX for its "own official deci-
sion[s]" and not "its employees' independent actions." See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291. Similarly,
"it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that
the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder,
500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978)).
146. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1175.
147. "[T]he term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations of... a col-
lege, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education ... 
20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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cause the school sanctions and exercises control over these
activities. 148 Recruiting practices, however, present a more difficult
issue. Though a university may generally authorize an athletic pro-
gram and its legitimate goals, 149 it is unreasonable to assume that the
university thereby sanctions any abuse that may occur within the pro-
gram. Therefore, such abuse seemingly cannot be considered the offi-
cial policy of the university. According to the Office of Civil Rights,
however, the lack of a sexual harassment policy within an educational
institution's program is a de facto policy. 150 Essentially, by not acting
to prevent the harassment, the school gives tacit approval to such har-
assment. 151 The Tenth Circuit followed this approach in determining
that CU had a policy, though not a deliberate one, of allowing sexual
harassment to occur.152
To understand the Tenth Circuit's finding that CU had a policy of
ignoring the risk of sexual harassment, it is necessary to understand
the court's reliance on City of Canton v. Harris,153 which was cited in
both Davis and Gebser.154 In Harris, the Supreme Court found that a
municipality could be liable under § 1983 for the constitutional viola-
tions of its agents if the violations resulted from inadequate training,
to which the municipality remained deliberately indifferent. t 55 The
primary inquiry is whether there is a direct causal link between the
failure to adequately train and the violation. 156 Allegations that the
municipality's agent committed a violation concerning a matter for
which the municipality trained its officials are not sufficient. 157 In-
148. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2007).
149. Heckman, supra note 26, at 218 ("[P]resumably the conduct of the athletics department
involves an official policy of the recipient of federal funds[.]").
150. SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 19 ("Schools are required by the
Title IX regulations to adopt and publish a policy against sex discrimination .... Accordingly,
regardless of whether harassment occurred, a school violates this requirement of the Title IX
regulations if it does not have those procedures and policy in place.").
151. Id.; see also Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 419 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("Deliberate indifference is thus treated ... as tantamount to intent, so that inaction
by a policymaker deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm is equivalent to the inten-
tional action that setting policy presupposes.").
152. Surprisingly, the Tenth Circuit's opinion is the first to conclude that harassment may have
occurred because of an official school policy. See Heckman, supra note 29, at 488.
153. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
154. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642-43 (1999)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998).
155. Harris, 489 U.S. at 388. The facts of Harris alleged that officers were not given training
to determine when to seek medical care for an injured detainee, a situation that was almost
inevitably faced by detention officers. Id. at 382.
156. Id. at 385. "[F]or liability to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in [the]
training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury." Id. at 391.
157. Id. at 389.
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stead, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that the training was obviously in-
adequate in light of a known risk that accompanies such a failure to
train. 158 The Court stressed that liability in these situations rested on
a clear showing of deliberate indifference; otherwise, every person al-
leging a violation due to inadequate training could point to something
that the municipality could have done to avoid the incident. 159
Recognizing that the Supreme Court has found municipal liability
under § 1983 to be a comparable framework for analyzing Title IX
cases, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied Harris to the facts in Simp-
son. By substituting the educational institution for the municipality, it
becomes clear how inadequate training within an educational institu-
tion program may lead to Title IX liability. Instead of police officers,
the University's agents are the player-hosts in charge of showing re-
cruits a good time.160 Though it may seem that the University did not
control player-hosts and recruits in the same way that a municipality
controls police officers, the player-hosts in Simpson were, in fact, op-
erating as University representatives because the University delegated
supervisory responsibilities to these individuals. 161
As the Court made clear in Gebser and Brown, an educational insti-
tution cannot be held liable for the actions of its agents under a theory
of respondeat superior.162 The Tenth Circuit, however, found that
these player-host agents could expose the University to Title IX liabil-
ity if a court determined that it was negligent in training or supervising
its agents regarding the implementation of the University's official
recruiting policy. 163
158. Id. at 390 (recognizing that "the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers...
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need").
159. Id. at 392. This would result in "de facto respondeat superior liability," which the Court
has rejected in previous decisions. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94
(1978)).
160. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007).
161. The coaching staff assigned hosts to recruits during their visits based on common interest.
INDEP. INVESTIGATIVE COMM'N, FINAL REPORT TO THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO BOARD OF
REGENTS 9 (2004), available at http://web.dailycamera.com/pdf/cu/iic-final-report.pdf. The
Code of Federal Regulations addresses Title IX liability based on the actions of agents by stating
that Title IX does not shelter educational institutions from liability if the institution delegates the
provision of student benefits and services to third parties who engage in gender discrimination in
administering what is, in effect, the institution's program. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(3) (2007).
162. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998); Bd. of the County
Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397. 403 (1997).
163. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184-85. An examination of general agency principles is also help-
ful: "A principal who conducts an activity through an agent is subject to liability for harm to a
third party caused by the agent's conduct if the harm was caused by the principal's negligence in
selecting, training, retaining, supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) (2006).
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Under the Tenth Circuit's analysis, the focus shifts away from ques-
tions as to whether CU had actual notice of the harassment. Instead,
the inquiry hinges on whether the University had notice that its train-
ing or supervision was inadequate in light of a known risk that was
substantially certain to materialize if not addressed. Under those cir-
cumstances, the challenge of establishing a Title IX violation is more
surmountable. 164
D. Application to the Simpson Case
The Simpson facts indicate that the University first became aware
of sexual misconduct within its recruiting program when a high school
student alleged that recruits sexually assaulted her at a 1997 off-cam-
pus party. 165 After this incident, two Boulder County district attor-
neys met with University officials to express their concern that women
were being made available to recruits for sex.166 During this meeting,
the district attorneys also suggested that the University implement a
zero-tolerance policy regarding alcohol use and sex during recruiting
visits.' 67 A subsequent investigation revealed that the changes made
after this meeting were minor and the coaching staff still did not pro-
vide specific instructions or training to player-hosts regarding recruit
supervision. 168
The totality of these incidents suggests a strong case that the Uni-
versity knew of the risk of sexual assault during recruiting visits.' 69
This knowledge should have been sufficient to alert University offi-
cials to the necessity of providing better training and guidelines to its
player-hosts in order to prevent the risk of harassment from material-
izing. 170 The Tenth Circuit correctly held that a jury could infer that
the risk of sexual assault and the need for more or different training
was so obvious, and the University's response so inadequate, that the
University was deliberately indifferent. 171
164. Diane Heckman, Tracing the History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases, 183
EDuc. L. REP. 1, 28 (2004) (stating that, traditionally, "educational institutions are well-insulated
from the imposition of Title IX liability for peer sexual harassment occurring within their
parameters").
165. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181; see also INDEP. INVESTIGATIVE COMM'N, supra note 161, at 17.
166. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181-82.
167. INDEP. INVESTIGATIVE COMM'N, supra note 161, at 18. An additional incident involved a
previous recruit who approached Coach Barnett about the improprieties he had seen while on a
recruiting visit. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1183.
168. INDEP. INVESTIGATIVE COMM'N, supra note 161, at 19.
169. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184-85.
170. Id.
171. See id.
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Regardless of how a jury would have ultimately decided the suffi-
ciency of the University's response, Simpson presents a new approach
to Title IX liability. However, the Tenth Circuit's approach does not
stray far from the Supreme Court's previous actual notice and deliber-
ate indifference standards.
E. A New Standard of Liability?
In articulating its modified approach to Title IX liability, the Tenth
Circuit pointed out that actual notice and insufficient response re-
quirements do not apply to cases involving official policies of educa-
tional institutions.172 The Tenth Circuit's supposedly new standard for
Title IX liability in situations involving official policies requires that
the need for training is obvious, and that the school is deliberately
indifferent to this need.1 73 These requirements, however, are not
unique to liability under an official-policy framework.
The Tenth Circuit's requirement that the need for additional train-
ing and supervision be obvious is analogous to Gebser's requirement
that the school have actual knowledge of the harassment. 174 If a need
for additional or improved training is obvious to an educational insti-
tution, then the institution presumably has actual notice of the need,
as opposed to constructive notice. 175 It follows that the school has
actual notice of the substantial risk associated with a failure to provide
such training as well. Though the application is different, actual no-
tice is still required under the Tenth Circuit's approach. 176 In other
words, the traditional Title IX analysis requires actual notice of ongo-
ing harassment, whereas the new Tenth Circuit analysis requires ac-
tual knowledge of the risk of harassment created by an official policy.
The other factors in proving a Title IX sexual harassment claim re-
main the same: the school must receive federal funding, the school
must be deliberately indifferent to the need for additional or better
172. Id. at 1176.
173. Id. at 1184-85.
174. "Actual notice" is defined as "[niotice given directly to, or received personally by, a
party." BLACK'S LAW DICTrIONARY 1090 (8th ed. 2004). "Obvious" is defined as "easily per-
ceived or understood; clear." CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DIc-rIONARY 983 (10th ed. 2002).
175. "Constructive notice" is defined as "[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the exis-
tence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY, supra note 174, at 1090. The Court rejected liability based on constructive notice in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274. 290 (1998).
176. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 1178 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he
§ 1983 municipal-liability cases reveal how the standard changes when the claim 'involve[s] offi-
cial policy . . .although the underlying principle . . .remains the same." (internal citations
omitted)).
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training, and the risk involved must be so severe as to deny an educa-
tional benefit. 177
Previously, an educational institution faced liability only if it was
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment involving two known
parties of which it had actual knowledge. 178 This approach left an ac-
countability gap for situations in which the risk of harassment was ob-
vious to the school, but the identities of the harasser and victim could
not be determined in advance. The Tenth Circuit's approach fills this
gap by permitting liability when a university has actual notice of the
severe risk of harassment that could be avoided by adequate training,
but remains deliberately indifferent in preventing the risk from
materializing. 79
Simpson is not the first case to examine allegations that an educa-
tional institution was aware of a substantial risk of sexual harassment
instead of the actual occurrence of such harassment. i80 In Delgado v.
Stegall, Judge Posner discussed the notice and deliberate indifference
standards by comparing the two to a theory of recklessness. 181 While
Judge Posner recognized that Supreme Court precedent requires a
plaintiff in a Title IX damages suit to prove actual knowledge of mis-
conduct and not just actual knowledge of the risk of misconduct,'182 he
expressed his view of the appropriate standard for Title IX liability:
When the cases speak of a "known" or "obvious" risk that makes a
failure to take steps against it reckless they have in mind risks so
great they that are almost certain to materialize if nothing is done
.... [I]t is only in such cases that recklessness regarding the conse-
quences if the risk materializes merges with intention to bring about
the consequences (more precisely, to allow the consequences to oc-
cur though they could be readily prevented from occurring).183
Therefore, according to Judge Posner, an educational institution
should face liability when it recklessly ignores a "known" or "obvi-
177. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S 629 (1999);
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
179. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.
180. See, e.g., Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing liability in situations
involving known and obvious risks); Johnson v. Galen Health Insts., Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 679,
688 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that "the actual notice standard is met when an appropriate official
has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to students based on prior complaints by
other students").
181. 367 F.3d at 671 ("Deliberate indifference means shutting one's eyes to a risk one knows
about but would prefer to ignore. It thus corresponds to the criminal definition of recklessness,
which the law treats as the equivalent of intentionality." (internal citations omitted)).
182. Id. at 672.
183. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
[Vol. 58:153
2008] SIMPSON V. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 175
ous" risk when the means to prevent the risk from materializing are
available. 184 Judge Posner's explanation is similar to the Tenth Cir-
cuit's analysis.1 85
Under the Tenth Circuit's approach, courts may find a recipient
school liable for Title IX sexual harassment claims in two scenarios:
when the harassment has already occurred and when a substantial cer-
tainty exists that the harassment will occur. All previous requirements
for Title IX liability remain intact. 186
F. Does Simpson Comport with the Language and
Intent of Title IX?
Because the Tenth Circuit's opinion appears to expose educational
institutions to liability under a new standard-when the violation oc-
curs as the result of official policy-it is important to determine if this
interpretation is consistent with the language and purpose of Title IX.
The Tenth Circuit's approach fully accomplishes the goals of Title IX
by filling the accountability gap that existed under prior precedent,
which imposed liability only after the fact.' 87 Nonetheless, the poten-
tial breadth of the Tenth Circuit's approach must be tempered by the
confines of Title IX liability set forth in previous Supreme Court
decisions.
In Davis, the Court stressed that Title IX liability must be circum-
scribed to situations in which the school has notice of its potential
liability. 18 8 Perhaps the narrow constraints of Title IX liability were
best defined in the district court decision that the Tenth Circuit over-
ruled in Simpson: "The more a risk becomes generalized, the more
that risk is likely to fall outside of the narrowly circumscribed scope of
Title IX liability. In other words, the risk at issue must be well-de-
fined and focused to support a claim of Title IX liability." 89 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that an educational
institution may be liable for damages under Title IX for only its own
misconduct, 190 which Davis defines as liability for remaining deliber-
184. Id.
185. The Tenth Circuit's focus on the obvious need for training implies that an obvious risk of
harassment also exists.
186. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
187. Gebser and Davis outlined a reactive framework to Title IX liability-responding effec-
tively to known instances of harassment-whereas Simpson's approach is more proactive-
preventing imminent risks of harassment through anticipatory measures.
188. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999).
189. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236 (D. Colo. 2005) (applying the
Davis analysis), rev'd sub noma. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir.
2007).
190. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
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ately indifferent to the misconduct of others and not liability for the
misconduct itself.191 Consequently, the Supreme Court found that lia-
bility rests on the educational institution's degree of control over the
harasser and the environment in which the harassment occurs. 192
In light of the above precepts, the Tenth Circuit's opinion does not
conflict with precedent. First, when an institution implements a policy
or program, it cannot reasonably claim that it has no notice of the
liability it will face if the program or policy proximately causes a Title
IX violation. Second, the Simpson analysis does not unconditionally
hold a school liable for every act of those over whom it exercises con-
trol; a school will face liability only for its own failure to properly
supervise or train individuals under its control when the need to do so
is obvious. 193 Therefore, the scope of Title IX remains tightly focused
on situations in which the risk of harassment is clear and the means to
prevent it are available. Finally, an educational institution will face
liability only when it exercises a substantial degree of control over the
harassment and the environment in which it occurs. Though the insti-
tution may not directly control the harasser, the institution does po-
tentially control the circumstances that could lead to harassment-for
example, an environment in which those implementing the policy have
received obviously inadequate training and supervision.' 94
A careless interpretation of the Tenth Circuit's opinion may lead to
the conclusion that educational institutions could be exposed to liabil-
ity whenever they have initiated a program or enacted a policy. While
the Simpson decision finds that Title IX liability may attach to viola-
tions occurring as a result of official policy, the actual notice and de-
liberate indifference standards remain intact as safeguards.1 95 A
plaintiff must show not only that the school had actual notice of the
inadequate training or supervision, but also that the school's response
to this inadequacy was deliberately indifferent. 196 These requirements
protect a school from liability in situations where the plaintiff claims
that the school could have done something to prevent the harassment
191. Id. at 646-47.
192. Id. at 646.
193. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007); see also supra
notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
194. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184-85.
195. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
196. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184-85. A court will not find a school to be deliberately indiffer-
ent unless the response to the risk of harassment, or lack thereof, is "clearly unreasonable in
light of the known circumstances." Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ.,
526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999).
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from occurring.1 97 Instead, Title IX liability will attach only when
known incidents or circumstances placed the school on notice of the
fact that the risk of harassment is substantially likely to materialize if
the school does not act.
V. IMPACT
The Tenth Circuit's opinion will likely have a profound impact on
the way universities manage their athletic departments and recruit-
ment programs. Yet the decision might also affect how educational
institutions that receive federal funding implement and monitor other
programs or policies outside of athletics. School officials worry that
the Tenth Circuit's decision exposes their ' institutions "to liability
based upon the adequacy of their training, not whether they failed to
respond to known harassment. ' 198 While this potential does exist,
these fears are likely unfounded because the notice and indifference
standards still impose a high standard of liability. In fact, liability
standards are no different than they were under the traditional frame-
work. 199 Simpson's only distinction is that it provides an articulated
liability standard for situations in which an institution's official policy
created or increased the likelihood of harassment.
Section A examines Simpson's effect on university athletic and re-
cruitment practices. 200 Section B discusses how courts that broadly
interpret Simpson could hold schools liable for failing to implement
policies that make sexual harassment less likely.201 Finally, Section C
considers how the conservative majority of today's Supreme Court
might view the Tenth Circuit's new approach to Title IX liability. 202
A. How Will Simpson Affect University Athletic
Recruitment Practices?
The Simpson ruling will have the most direct effect on the way
many university athletic departments operate their recruitment pro-
grams. But to fully understand Simpson's impact in this area, one
must understand the pervasive use of sex and alcohol in college re-
cruitment. The practices described in the Simpson decision are so
197. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (rejecting a lesser standard of
liability). One can easily imagine situations in which plaintiffs could allege that additional
teacher supervision or training would have prevented the harassment, though the need prior to
the harassment was not obvious at the time.
198. Anas, supra note 12.
199. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 203-213 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 214-229 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 230-236 and accompanying text.
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widespread that even Coach Barnett recognized that sex in recruiting
is a part of football culture that would be almost impossible to elimi-
nate entirely. 20 3 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit's landmark ruling will
likely push universities nationwide to seek a more active role in assur-
ing that these activities do not continue on their campuses.
The "good time" policy promoted by the coaching staff in Simpson
was in no way unique to the University of Colorado. In fact, many
consider the use of sex in college recruitment a part of football culture
that has become a form of institutionalized sexism hardly talked
about, but impossible to ignore.20 4 College recruiting is highly com-
petitive, and in order to recruit "blue-chip high school athletes," uni-
versities often ignore the questionable activities that occur after
campus tours and dinners with coaching staff.205 Such practices have
existed for over fifty years, and hostess groups such as the "Gator
Guides," "Georgia Girls," and "Bama Belles" are now infamous.20 6
Though universities have made highly public changes to recruitment
programs in recent years, the previous culture remains, leading many
recruits to expect opportunities for sex and partying when they arrive
on campus.20 7
The Tenth Circuit's ruling undoubtedly sent shockwaves through
athletic programs nationwide. 208 The appellate decision likely en-
couraged universities to reevaluate their own recruitment procedures,
regardless of their involvement in similar practices. After Simpson,
even universities that had no previous knowledge of sexual miscon-
duct would be wise to implement departmental changes and guide-
lines concerning acceptable behavior during campus visits. Future
courts might even consider the highly publicized decision and recent
exposure of related misconduct at other universities as sufficient no-
203. See Greg Avery, Sex, Parties and Alcohol Ingrained in Recruiting Culture, DAILY CAM-
ERA, Feb. 1, 2004, at IC.
204. Murray Sperber, Sex and Booze: Two Steps to Winning Football, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 12, 2004, at B24.
205. See Avery, supra note 203.
206. Id. Recently, however, these groups have expanded to include men due to the public
perception that they existed for purposes other than showing recruits around campus. See David
Epstein, Crushed Spirit, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Sept. 22, 2005, http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2005/09/22/spirit.
207. Avery, supra note 203; see also Joe Watson, Risky Behavior Not Policed in ASU Football
Recruiting, ARIZ. ST. U. PRESS, Dec. 9, 2002, http://asuwebdevilarchive.asu.edu/issues/2003/02/
26/specialreports/339775 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (quoting Notre Dame's assistant athletic di-
rector that "when you present a group of attractive females to a high school football player,
that's the impression [an offering of sex] you're giving them").
208. See Brady, supra note 1.
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tice that a need for training and supervision is obvious in all similar
recruitment programs. 20 9
Less than six months after the 2001 assaults, CU implemented nu-
merous changes to its program. 210 It now notifies visiting athletes and
their parents, in writing, of behavior expectations, establishes strict
curfews with reporting mechanisms, increases adult supervision, uses
well-trained upperclassmen as player-hosts, and provides well-struc-
tured itineraries for recruitment visits. 211 Other universities will likely
make similar changes, in addition to ensuring that all athletes and
coaches are properly educated and trained regarding sexual miscon-
duct. Though these changes will not provide a defense for a university
that remains deliberately indifferent to reported acts of harassment,
such changes will provide comfort to universities that face charges of a
Title IX violation. 212
For many university athletic departments, Simpson is a wake-up
call. The decision signals that athletic programs can no longer turn a
blind eye to the issue and must instead implement real, substantial
changes and guidelines ensuring that these practices do not continue.
At the very least, the Tenth Circuit's decision has sent a message to
educational institutions nationwide that they must hold their athletic
departments to the same standards as their academic departments. 213
B. How Will Simpson Affect Educational Institutions' Views of
Title IX Liability in Other Areas?
The Simpson decision, in its most literal interpretation, provides an
efficient framework for addressing Title IX liability when schools fail
to establish reasonable guidelines and training for student-run pro-
grams.214 However, the language of the Tenth Circuit's opinion could
easily be interpreted to find Title IX liability in instances where "the
need for more or different training [of the student population was] so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in [Title IX violations],
that [school officials could] reasonably be said to have been deliber-
209. In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit also considered articles addressing sexual misconduct in
recruiting as a national phenomenon, though the court focused more heavily on instances spe-
cific to CU. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1180-81, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007).
210. INDEP. INVESTIGATIVE COMM'N, supra note 161, at 21.
211. Id.
212. Spies, supra note 47, at 459.
213. Peter Schmidt, U. of Colorado Ruling May Alter Enforcement of Title IX, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 21, 2007, at A29.
214. Recruiting programs where students act as player-hosts and university ambassadors are
examples. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1180: see also Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154
F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving Title IX liability for student leaders' actions within an
ROTC program).
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ately indifferent to the need. '215 This broader interpretation of Simp-
son would hold schools liable whenever an official policy-
implemented by faculty or students-is obviously deficient and likely
to result in sexual harassment, if not modified.
Critics of the opinion correctly point out that liability under these
circumstances would be an expansion of Title IX.216 Previously, edu-
cational institutions could avoid Title IX liability by claiming that, de-
spite the likelihood that their obviously deficient policies and
programs facilitated or caused the misconduct, they had no knowledge
of the alleged harassment prior to its occurrence.217 Under this
broader interpretation, however, educational institutions could face li-
ability for remaining deliberately indifferent to known instances of
harassment, as well as for remaining deliberately indifferent to obvi-
ously flawed programs and policies.
The Tenth Circuit's approach to Title IX liability could essentially
create another category of harassment. Previously, Title IX sexual
harassment cases were divided into two categories: quid pro quo and
hostile environment-also known as teacher-on-student and peer-on-
peer harassment. 218 Under a broader Simpson framework, however, a
new "class-on-class" category is created. Though similar to hostile en-
vironment, class-on-class differs from the other categories because it
does not involve identified victims or harassers. Instead, it involves
identified classes of victim and harasser. In Simpson, for example, the
identified class of harassers was certain football players and recruits
and the identified class of victims was the female student population,
in particular, female hostesses and ambassadors. 219
If courts were to adopt this new, broader classification, schools re-
ceiving federal funding would be required to respond to risks that
have yet to materialize. 220 Under this framework, schools would be
responsible for not adequately responding to imminent risks of stu-
dent misconduct, maybe even when previous incidents of harassment
have not provided notice. On its face, this approach would require
215. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184-85 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390
(1989)).
216. Many critics fear that Simpson is inimical to educational interests, because it opens the
floodgates to liability that Congress never intended. Schmidt, supra note 213.
217. See, e.g., Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1245 (D. Colo. 2005), rev'd sub
nom. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).
218. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
219. At the very least, Boulder County district attorneys informed University officials that
female students were being made available to recruits for sex. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1181-82.
220. In particular, schools would be required to respond when the need for policy changes was
"so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in [Title IX violations] .... " Id. at 1184
(alteration in original).
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schools to take an unprecedented, more aggressive approach to all
forms of past, present, and future harassment.
Regardless of the implications of a broad interpretation of Simpson,
the consequences would be neither unreasonable nor unworkable.
Few could argue that educational institutions should remain shielded
from liability when they refuse to amend policies that make student
abuse more likely to occur.22' The language of Title IX creates an
affirmative duty for schools to implement policies that assure students
are not subjected to discrimination on the basis of sex.222 The Simp-
son approach, however, would not likely open the floodgates of Title
IX liability, because the same safeguards existing under previous pre-
cedent remain.
As stated in Section IV, the need for additional training or supervi-
sion must reach a level of obviousness that is akin to actual notice. 223
Furthermore, an institution's response to the need for training will not
be questioned, provided the response is not "clearly unreasonable in
light of the known circumstances. '22 4 Blatantly ignoring an obvious
need for policy or program changes would and should expose schools
to liability, but schools can protect themselves by taking action that is
appropriate for the situation.225 The most difficult inquiry, however,
is determining when policy or program deficiencies have become
obvious.
Most commonly, the need for additional measures becomes obvious
when an educational institution has knowledge of previous incidents
within its programs.226 For example, a school may sponsor academic
clubs that travel to other schools for competition. Initially, there is no
obvious need to train or provide students with additional guidelines
regarding appropriate physical contact during these trips. However,
after numerous instances of misconduct reportedly occur during these
excursions, the school confronts an apparent need to increase or re-
vise student guidelines and supervision. Under Simpson, failure to
implement reasonable changes in light of this obvious need may ex-
221. This includes liability for failing to implement a policy, which courts will consider a de
facto policy. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
222. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
223. See supra notes 172-186 and accompanying text.
224. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 648 (1999).
225. Courts must give schools broad discretion in these matters to prevent Monday-morning
quarterbacking by pointing out measures the school could have taken.
226. See Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) ("If a program does
not prevent constitutional violations ... decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a
new program is called for.").
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pose the school to Title IX liability if and when the risk of harassment
materializes. 227
On the other hand, the need for additional measures can also be
obvious because of the nature of the program. 228 For example, in co-
ed university dormitories, there need be no previous harassment on
record for a school to recognize that supervision and student guide-
lines are necessary to prevent sexual misconduct from occurring
within university-sponsored housing. It seems logical that a university
would establish rules and supervision to prevent the obvious risks as-
sociated with young men and women cohabiting for the first time in
their lives. However, in the event that the university did not take rea-
sonable preventative measures and sexual harassment did occur, a
broader interpretation of Simpson might hold the university liable for
failing to take minimal steps to thwart the inevitable likelihood of sex-
ual misconduct.
Under this expanded interpretation of Simpson, educational institu-
tions must remain cognizant of and cure obvious deficiencies in their
programs and policies. Though no court before Simpson has articu-
lated this standard, it is not novel or unreasonable to expect schools to
recognize and remedy programs and policies that endanger the people
they are designed to serve. 229 However, educational institutions will
face expanded Title IX liability only in situations of egregious disre-
gard, because institutions enjoy the same safeguards that existed
before Simpson. Therefore, exposing schools to potential Title IX lia-
bility under a broad Simpson interpretation may better effectuate the
goals of Title IX. This interpretation would give schools the leeway to
implement the policies that they deem most effective, while at the
same time forcing them to take action before harassment occurs
rather than merely reacting after the fact.
C. How Would the Current Supreme Court Evaluate Title IX
Sexual Harassment Resulting from a
School's Official Policy?
In Simpson, the Tenth Circuit clearly stated that existing Title IX
precedent provided an imperfect framework for analyzing Title IX
sexual harassment cases involving official school policy. 230 The opin-
ion in Simpson raises the question of how the current Supreme Court
227. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007).
228. See id. at 1178-79 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).
229. As one commentator noted, "If [schools] keep having red flags come up and they don't
do anything about it ... it is not a stretch for them to be held liable." Schmidt, supra note 213.
230. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1174.
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majority would view the Tenth Circuit's approach. However, to un-
derstand fully how today's Court might approach Title IX liability in
this new context, an examination of the dissent in Davis is useful be-
cause the dissenting Justices strongly opposed liability in situations of
peer-on-peer harassment. 231 The conservative Justices who wrote and
joined the dissent are now part of the Court's majority.232 An analysis
of their dissenting opinion might provide interesting insights into how
these Justices would rule if presented with this issue.
In the Davis dissent, Justice Kennedy contended that sexual harass-
ment occurring between peers should not expose a school to Title IX
liability because it does not occur under a school program. 233 How-
ever, this argument appears tenuous in situations where the institu-
tion's policy or program creates or ignores the likelihood of
misconduct. Under these circumstances, the harassment clearly oc-
curs under the school's program, over which the school exercises abso-
lute control.234 Additionally, the dissenting Justices in Davis relied
heavily on the fact that educational institutions, in particular public
schools and universities, do not control students in the same way that
they control teachers or others with whom they contract. 235 But in
situations like Simpson, where the university chooses the students to
carry out its program, the educational institution does exercise a level
of control over students' actions. Though schools do not control the
independent actions of these individuals outside of the scope of their
delegated responsibilities, they do have control over establishing pro-
gram guidelines and training that attempt to prevent obvious risks
from materializing.
Justice Kennedy's focus on an institution's lack of control would
likely cause the current conservative majority the most difficulty in
confronting the Tenth Circuit's approach. The Davis dissenters' con-
cerns about institutional control over the harasser and the environ-
ment may be relevant regarding students acting independently, but
231. See generally Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
676 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. Justice Kennedy authored the dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas joined. Id. at 632. Due to the passing of Justice Rehnquist and the
recent addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, the Court now has a conservative
majority.
233. Id. at 661-62 (referencing the language of 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
234. See Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178 ("Implementation of an official policy can certainly be a
circumstance in which the recipient exercises significant 'control over the harasser and the envi-
ronment in which the harassment occurs."' (internal citations omitted)).
235. Davis, 526 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). With regard to university liability, Jus-
tice Kennedy stressed that these institutions "do not exercise custodial and tutelary power over
their adult students." Id. at 667.
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these concerns do not apply to students acting under the official policy
or program of the institution.236 Therefore, Justice Kennedy's con-
cerns are not implicated in the Tenth Circuit's opinion, and it is un-
clear how the current conservative majority would approach Title IX
liability under the Simpson framework.
VI. CONCLUSION
Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder potentially reshapes
how courts approach Title IX sexual harassment cases. The Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized that not all incidents of harassment fit neatly into situ-
ations where the victim and aggressor remain constant throughout.
Simpson outlined a framework for holding educational institutions lia-
ble when their official policies or programs make harassment more
likely. In doing so, Simpson closed an accountability gap that existed
previously, in which schools could turn a blind eye to substantial risks
that had yet to materialize.
Simpson specifically focused on situations where students act as
agents in carrying out official institutional policy. However, the lan-
guage of the opinion lends itself to interpretation outside of this prin-
cipal-agent relationship. A broader interpretation of the decision
could lead courts to find liability when a school ignores deficient poli-
cies, whether they are carried out by school officials, teachers, or
other students.
This expanded liability creates questions about the scope of Title IX
and whether holding schools to a higher standard is proper. Closer
analysis, however, shows that schools remain shielded by'actual notice
and deliberate indifference standards and can protect themselves from
liability by acting reasonably in situations where the risk of harass-
ment has become obvious. Requiring educational institutions to use
their best efforts to prevent harassment, whether it be ongoing or im-
minent, is exactly what Title IX has required since 1972. Thirty-six
years later, Simpson is a much needed step in that direction.
Wes R. McCart*
236. In fact, Justice Kennedy wrote that a natural reading of the statute finds a violation of
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ities, or policies of the grant recipient." Id. at 659.
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